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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper investigates the economiceffect of tax incentives for Ameri-
can exports. These incentives include a partialtax exemption for export
profits (available by routingexports through foreign sales corporations)
and the allocation of someexport profits to foreign-source income for
purposes of U.S. taxation. The analysis highlights threeimportant as-
pects of these policies. First, official figuresappear to understate dramati-
cally the tax expenditures associated withsome U.S. export incentives.
Correctly measured, total export benefitsprovided through the income
tax are equivalent to a i-percent ad valoremsubsidy. Second, the 1984
imposition of more rigorous requirements forobtaining export subsidies
through foreign sales corporations iscontemporaneous with a signifi-
cant change in the pattern of U.S. exports.Estimates imply that the 1984
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changes reduced U.S. manufacturingexports by 3.1 percent. Third,
there were significant marketreactions to the 1997 event in whichthe
European Union charged thatU.S. income tax provisions areinconsis-
tent with World TradeOrganization rules prohibiting exportsubsidies.
Filing of the European complaintcoincides with a 0.1-percent fall inthe
value of the U.S. dollar and steepdrops in the share prices of major
American exporters.
1. INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 1997, the EuropeanUnion brought a complaint before
the World Trade Organization(WTO), accusing the United Statesof
violating the rules prohibitingmembers of the WTO from subsidizing
exports. Europe maintainedthat provisions allowing Americanfirms to
route their export salesthrough tax-avoidance devices known asforeign
sales corporations (FSC5)provide firms with export-contingent taxsubsi-
dies of roughly $4 billion a year.The European Union argued that Euro-
pean firms arethereby unfairly disadvantaged incompetition with
American firms in foreign markets,and requested that the WTO require
the United States to discontinue its programor else faceWTO-imposed
sanctions and penalties.
As trade disputes often do, theconflict between the European Union
and the United States thenmoved to consultations between the two
parties, in this case to no avail.Ultimately, in July 1998, the European
Union lodged a more formalcomplaint, and over the followingmonths
the complaint was considered by apanel of WTO member countries.
This WTO dispute resolutionpanel issued a report in May 1999highly
critical of the U.S. FSC rules, a reportthat was formally adopted by the
WTO in February 2000.
While the World Trade Organizationinitially gave the United States a
deadline of October 1, 2000 for legislatingchanges in the FSC provisions,
a last-minuteagreement extended the deadlinefor the resolution of this
trade dispute through the middleof 2001. As of the time of this writing
(October 2000), new Americanlegislation that is intended to meetthe
WTO requirement is currentlyworking its way through Congress.This
new legislation formally scrapsthe existing system of FSCswhile replac-
ing it with an almostidentical tax regime that adds minorsales incen-
tives for foreign affiliates ofAmerican firms. Whether thislegislation wifi
ultimately become U.S. law, and, if itdoes so, whether the WTO and the
European Union wifi beplacated by this change, remain to be seen.
The purpose of this paper is toevaluate the economic importanceof
the American export incentivesthat lie at the heart of this dispute.Sec-The Uneasy Marriage of ExportIncentives and the Income Tax43
tion 2 describes the two primarytax subsidies currently availableto
American exporters and theirinteraction.1 While FSCs allow firmsto exempt a portion of export profits,separate provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code allow exportersto allocate some fraction of profitson
export sales to foreign-source income fromthe standpoint of U.S. taxa-
tion, thereby shielding the allocatedportion from U.S. taxes. Section3 traces the history of these tax subsidiesand the disputes with which they
are associated. Section 4 presents dataon the extent to which American
exporters enjoy the benefits of thesetwo subsidies and the patterns of
their use over the last two decades.It is noteworthy that, in spite ofthe WTO's focus on FSCs, theexport incentive provided by the abilityto
allocate export profits to foreign-sourceincome is quite possibly several
times larger than the export incentivethat arises from exemptinga por- tion of export profits attributedto FSCs.
Section 5 evaluates the influenceof export incentiveson the behavior
of American firms by consideringthe repercussions of twoevents: the
establishment of FSCs and repealof their predecessors, the domestic
international sales corporations (DISCs)in 1984; and the filing of the
complaint against the United Statesbefore the WTO in 1997. Theevi- dence indicates that the transitionfrom the DISC regime to themore
administratively burdensome FSCprogram in 1984 led to reduced
American exports. This reducedexport activity is most pronounced in
those sectors characterized by thegreatest historical use of DISCs and
those dominated by smallerexporters. This evidence suggests thattran- sitions between export incentiveregimes can be costly to American
exporters, particularly smallones. By 1997, however, FSCswere well
established, and the filing ofa European complaint against the United
States is associated both witha decline in the value of the U.S. dollar
and with reduced share prices forAmerican exporters. Themagnitudes of these exchange-rate and stockprice movements are consistentwith
the threatened removal of thewidely used tax subsidy providedby the
FSC program. Stock market reactionsto the news of the Europeancom-
plaint are also indicative of theincidence of the export subsidy. Section6 concludes the paper.
The magnitude andscope of U.S. export incentives warrantparticular
attention not simply because of therecent WTO dispute. The importance
The phrase "export subsidy" appearinghere and elsewhere refers only to theeconomic concept of export subsidy (as used, for example, byKrugman and Obstfeld, 1991,pp. 108- 111) and not the legal concept of "exportsubsidy" as defined by WTO rules. A farmore elaborate legal and textual analysis than thatprovided in this paper is necessary in orderto determine whether or not U.S. exporttax incentives represent "export subsidies"as de- fined by the WTO.44Desai & Hines
of trade to U.S. multinationalcorporations, domestic concern over
outsourcing of production to foreignaffiliates, the magnitude of FSC
benefits received by large Americanexporters,2 and the chronic trade
deficit facing the United Statesall suggest that the delivery of taxincen-
tives to exporters will remain acentral aspect of the public policydebate
surrounding how corporations aretaxed. Regardless of the outcomeof
the WTO dispute, it isworthwhile to evaluate the effects of thecurious
mechanisms that have evolved tosubsidize American exports.3
2. AMERICAN EXPORTINCENTIVES
The U.S. tax system containsseveral provisions designed to encourage
American firms to export goodsfrom the United States to foreign coun-
tries. These provisions aredizzyingly complex, even by thestandards of
the Internal Revenue Code, as aresult of which it can be difficult to
establish their revenue impact andthe incentives for which they are re-
sponsible. The goal of this section is todescribe current export tax subsi-
dies, their interactions, and theincentives they create for Americanfirms.
The United States provides exporttax subsidies throughthe exemp-
tion of export profits from U.S.taxation and through the ability toallo-
cate export profits to foreign-sourceincome. Exemption of a fractionof
export profits from taxableincome typically occurs bythe routing of
exports through a distinct entitysuch as an FSC. The alternative ofallocat-
ing certain export profits toforeign-source income for the purposesof
U.S. income taxation effectivelyshields such export profits fromU.S.
income taxation for thosefirms with excess foreign taxcredits. While the
allocation method is more generousfor some taxpayers than the exemp-
tion method, it is also the morecomplicated of the two, and the focusof
much less popular attention.Consequently, this section first reviewsthe
U.S. tax provisions that permitthe exemption of certain fractionsof
export income from U.S. taxation.
2.1 Subsidy by Exemptionof Income: FSCs and IC-DISCs
Firms that export goods fromthe United States are entitled todo so in a
legally roundabout fashion thatenables them to exempt a fractionof
export profits from taxation.While complying with the necessaryrules
can be cumbersome,the tax advantages are largeenough to make it well
2Oyola (2000) provides estimates of thecontribution of FSC benefits to the net incomesof
major exporters.
Desai and Hines (2000a) examinethe relative welfare consequences ofdelivering export
subsidies on an ad valorem basis versusthrough the income tax.The Uneasy Marriage of ExportIncentives and the Income Tax 45
worth the while of most largeAmerican exporters to take advantageof this opportunity.
In order to benefit from thisexport tax subsidy, it isnecessary to
establish an FSC in an offshore locationsuch as Guam, Barbados,or the Virgin Islands. For legalpurposes, exports might then travel fromthe United States to their ultimateforeign destinations via the FSC.Hence,
an American computer company that sellsa computer manufactured in
Texas to a buyer in northernItaly first sells the computerto its FSC located in Guam, which inturn sells the computer to the buyerin Italy.
The computer does not travelto Guam in the course of this sale,nor are the FSC offices located in Guamtypically very active; instead, theseare
largely paper transactions. In thecourse of these transactions, the FSC
located in Guam earnsa profit; some of this profit is immediatelysubject to U.S. taxation, but a fascinatingis forever exempt, therebyproviding a tax subsidy for exporters.4
For an American firm whoseprofits are fully taxed by theUnited States at the 35-percentcorporate tax rate, there is a benefitassociated
with making the FSC's share oftotal export profitsas large as possible.5
Consider the case in which the Americancomputer manufacturer pro-
duces its computer for $1,500 in theUnited States and sells thecomputer
in Italy for $2,000. Without theuse of an FSC, all $500 of this profit is
subject to U.S. taxation at the35-percent rate. With the FSC involvedin the transaction, the FSC mightpurchase the computer for $1,885and sell it in Italy for $2,000, thereby earningan export profit of $115. The Ameri-
can exporting company therefore wifiowe taxes on the remaining $385
of export profits, and its FSC willlikewise owe U.S. taxesonX $115, or $40. The remaining $75 (X $115 = $75) of FSC profit isexempt from
U.S. taxation, and, since FSCsare located in offshore jurisdictions that
impose no taxes, the $75 is alsoexempt from foreign taxation. Ata tax
rate of 35 percent, this translates intoa tax saving of $26.25. Since the law
fixes theexclusion ratio, it is therefore in thetaxpayer's interest to
establish that the FSC export profitsare as large as possible.6
As a consequence, U.S. law alsorequires taxpayers to calculate the
profit of an FSC basedon methods that limit the exempt fractionof
Alternatively, the Guamanian FSC mightnot take title to the export property, but instead
receive a commission for facilitating theexport sale. According to data reported by Bel- monte (2000), 21% of FSCs in 1996 bought andsold export property, while the remaining 79% simply received commissions forexport sales.
The tax benefits of exporting throughFSCs are available to all corporations in theUnited States, including those that are foreign-owned.
6Taxpayers are not entitled to defer U.S.taxation of FSC profits. Corporations exporting
through FSCs instead receive tax benefitsin the form of the exemption ofof FSC profits.46Desai & Hines
total export profits. Taxpayers areentitled to choose amongseveral
different methods of distributingexport profits between theexporter
located in the United States andits offshore FSC. The first,and most
commonly used, method issimply to assign the FSC acommission
equal to 23 percent of exportprofits. In the previous example,$115 of
FSC profit was arrived atthrough the application of thismethod. It is
on the basis of theprevalence with which exportersassign their FSCs
23 percent of exportprofits, together with theexclusion ratio, that
FSCs are typically described asexempting 15 percent of exportprofits
from taxation.
The second method is to assignthe FSC a commissionequal to 1.83
percent of gross export sales.The profits assigned to theFSC under this
second method are required not toexceed twice those that would have
been assigned the FSC underthe 23-percent profit allocation.The third
profit calculation method is to usearm's-length pricing between the
American exporter and theFSC to determine the amountof export
income for which theFSC is responsible. Since FSCstypically do very
little on their own to facilitate exportsales, it is difficult to justifylarge
FSC profits on the basis ofthe third method, and as aresult, it is
seldom used.
In addition, taxpayers arealso entitled to use what areknown as
marginal costing techniques inorder to determine the sizeof export
profits when calculating FSC income.With marginal costing, exportprof-
its equal the differencebetween the ultimate sales pricesof export prop-
erty and the Americanexporter's marginal cost ofproduction. For this
purpose, marginalproduction costs include onlydirect material and
labor costs, thereby excludingselling costs and various fixed costssuch
as interest expenseand general administrative expenses.While the abil-
ity to expand the sizeof export profits is veryappealing to taxpayers,
marginal costing is subject to twoimportant limitations. The firstis that
marginal costing cannot be used toallocate more profit to an FSCthan
the firm actually earns on itsexports, after taking intoaccount selling
costs and a pro rata shareof various fixed costs. Thesecond limitation is
that the profit rate on exports, asdefined by marginal costing,and
measured as a fraction of exportsales, must not exceed thefirm's overall
profit rate, defined as the ratioof the firm's combined(domestic plus
foreign) profits to total sales. As aresult, it is useful to calculateFSC
income based on marginalcosting only when the profit rate onexports is
lower than the profit ratefor the firm as a whole.
Taxpayers are not required to usethe same methods to calculateFSC
profits for all export transactions,but can instead pick andchoose
among methods tomaximize tax benefits. Inparticular, it is possible toThe Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentivesand the Income Tax47
combine export transactions involvingsimilar products in calculating
export profits.
There are restrictions on the kindsof export sales that may be routed
through an FSC, as wellas restrictions on the details of FSCmanage-
ment. In order to be eligible for the tax benefitsoffered by FSCs, export
property must have no more than 50percent of non-U.S. content and
cannot be intended for ultimateuse in the United States. Qualifying
export property must be tangible, meaningthat patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and like propertycannot receive FSC treatment.7 Further-
more certain specific items are ineligible forFSC treatment. These in-
dude oil and gas products (other thanpetrochemicals), 50 percent of
military equipment sales, andvarious idiosyncratic commodities,includ-
ing unprocessed softwood timber,western red cedar, and horses for
slaughter shipped by sea.8
FSCs are subject to strict administrativerequirements. U.S. law re-
quires FSCs to be corporations organizedin foreign countriesor qualify-
ing U.S. possessions.9 FSCscannot have more than 25 shareholders,
must have at least one foreign director,and must hold all board of
directors and shareholder meetingsoutside the United States. An FSC
must use a foreign bank account andmaintain a foreign office, complete
with a permanent set of books, thoughthe foreign office need not be
located in the FSC's country ofincorporation. There is, however,no
requirement that any important decisionsbe made in an FSC's foreign
office. The FSC is required toparticipate in foreign sales activity,mean- ing at least one of solicitation,negotiation, and concluding salescon-
tractsthough this requirement is made ratherless burdensome by the
FSC's ability to hire its related supplieror another company to undertake
this activity on the FSC's behalf. TheFSC is also required to incurat least
half of the direct costs of foreignsales, including advertising andsales promotion, processing orders,transportation, and the like. Again,an
FSC is entitled to hire other firms,including related parties, to perform
these activities on its behalf.
Exporters of intangible property suchas patent rights are typically compensated in the
form of royalties that are treatedas foreign-source income under U.S. law and therefore
effectively untaxed if received by domestictaxpayers with excess foreign tax credits. See Hines (1995) for an analysis of theeconomic effect of this treatment of royaltyincome. Additionally, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997permitted computer software to receive FSC treatment starting in 1998.
8Importantly, slaughter horses shipped by airremain eligible for FSC treatment.
FSCs may be incorporated in U.S. possessionsother than Puerto Rico, countries covered
by the Caribbean Basin Economic RecoveryAct of 1983, or countries whose bilateraltax treaties with the United States containexchange-of-information provisions.48Descii & Hines
While the FSC rules aredesigned to facffitate the use of FSCs byall
exporters, the administrativeburdens they impose can be dauntingfor
small exporters. As a result, legislationestablishing FSCs also authorized
the creation of small FSCs,shared FSCs, and IC-DISCs,which serve to
facilitate the exports of smallcompanies. Small FSCs offer the sametax
benefits as regular FSCs with looserforeign materiality requirements;
they can be used by firms withexport receipts of less than $5million.
Similarly, a small FSC or atraditional FSC can be shared by up to25
exporters and therebyprovide the benefits of an FSC to exportersincapa-
ble of supporting the foreignmateriality requirements individually.Tax-
payers also have theoption of routing up to $10million of export sales
each year through an interest chargedomestic international sales corpora-
tion, or IC-DISC. An exporteris able to defer domestic taxliability on
export profits earned by salesrouted through an IC-DISC and notdistrib-
uted to the parent company, though itis necessary to pay the U.S. govern-
ment interest (at Treasurybifi rates) on any undistributedprofits of an IC-
DISC. The administrative requirementsof IC-DISCs are quite modest,
and their use typically permitssmall exporters to obtain thebenefits of
low-interest-rate loans from the governmentequal to the amount of tax
liabifities generated by exports.
2.2 Subsidy by Allocationof Income: Export SourceRules
An entirely separate typeof export subsidy is available toAmerican
multinational firms with excess foreign taxcredits. The nature of
the subsidy is that part or allof export profits can be treated asforeign-
source income forthe purpose of U.S. incometaxation. This export
subsidy is more generous to qualifyingfirms than is the subsidy pro-
vided by the use of FSCs. Since manyAmerican multinational firms
have excess foreign taxcredits,1° and the parent companiesof Ameri-
can multinationalfirms account for 58 percent ofall U.S. exports of
goods,'1 it follows that this exportsubsidy is potentially quite impor-
° Grubert, Randolph, and Rousslang (1996)report that firms with excessforeign tax
credits received 33 percent of the foreign incomeof American corporations in 1984, and66
percent in 1990, which follows theU.S. tax rate reduction in 1986. They notethat even this
66-percent figure is smaller than the 79 percentpredicted right after 1986, and conjecture
that contemporaneous foreign tax lawchanges along with the endogenousbehavior of
American companies may account forthe difference. They also note that thefraction of
foreign income received by firms with excessforeign tax credits appears to be falling over
time, reaching 35 percent in 1992. In asubsequent study, Grubert (2001) reportsadditional
evidence that changes in taxpayerbehavior (such as greatly expanded receiptsof foreign-
source royalty income) accountfor much of the unexpectedly lowincidence of excess-
foreign-tax credit status after 1986.
11See the data for 1997 reported in Matalorii(1999, p. 14).The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentives andthe Income Tax 49
tant. Notably, this subsidy is not availableto American exporters that
are not multinational firms.
In order to understand the tax subsidyavailable from the foreign-
source rules, and the circumstances under whichtaxpayers might be
eligible for the associated tax benefits,it is necessary to review certain
aspects of U.S. taxation of the foreign income ofAmerican taxpayers. A
brief description of some of the relevantfeatures follows.12
2.2.1 The Foreign Tax Credit Almost allcountries tax income generated
by economic activity that takes placewithin their borders. In addition,
many countriesincluding the United Statestax the foreignincomes
of their residents. In order toprevent double taxation of the foreign
income of Americans, U.S. law permitstaxpayers to claim foreign tax
credits for income taxes (and relatedtaxes) paid to foreign govern-
ments.13 These foreign tax creditsare used to offset U.S. tax liabilities
that would otherwise be dueon foreign-source income. The U.S. corpo-
rate tax rate is currently 35 percent,so an American corporation that
earns $100 in a foreign country with a lO-percenttax rate pays taxes of
$10 to the foreign government and $25to the U.S. government, since its
U.S. corporate tax liabifity of $35 (35percent of $100) is reduced to $25 by
the foreign tax credit of $10.
2.2.2 Tax Deferral Americansare permitted to defer U.S. tax liabilities
on certain unrepatriated foreign profits until they receivesuch profits in
the form of dividends.14 This deferralis available only on the active
business profits of American-owned foreignaffiliates that are separately
incorporated as subsidiaries in foreign countries.The profits of unincor-
porated foreign businesses, suchas those of American-owned branch
banks in other countries,are taxed immediately by the United States.
Interest, rent, and royalty income received fromforeign countries also
represents foreign-source income on which U.S.tax obligations cannot
be deferred.
12 Portions of this descriptionare excerpted from Hines (1991, 1999a).
13 The United States isnot alone in taxing the worldwide income of its residentswhile permitting them to claim foreign tax credits. Othercountries with such systems include
Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom.Under U.S. law, taxpayers may
claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid by foreign firmsof which they own at least 10
percent, and only those taxes that qualify as income taxesare creditable.
14 Deferral of home-countrytaxation of the unrepatriated profits of foreign subsidiariesis a common feature of systems that tax foreign incomes. Othercountries that permit this kind
of deferral include Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,Japan, Norway, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom.50Desai & Hines
U.S. tax law contains provisionsdesigned to prevent American firms
from delaying the repatriation oflightly-taxed foreign earnings.15 These
tax provisions apply tocontrolled foreign corporations, which arefor-
eign corporations owned at least 50percent by American individuals or
corporations who hold stakes of at least10 percent each. Under the
Subpart F provisions of U.S. law,the passive income of controlled for-
eign corporations is "deemeddistributed," and therefore immediately
taxable by the United States, even if notrepatriated as dividend pay-
ments to American parentfirms.16
2.2.3 Excess Foreign Tax CreditsBecause the foreign tax credit isin-
tended to alleviate international doubletaxation, and not to reduce U.S.
tax liabffities on profitsearned within the United States, theforeign tax
credit is limited to U.S. tax liabifity onforeign-source income. For exam-
ple, an American firm with $200 offoreign income that faces an U.S. tax
rate of 35 percent has aforeign-tax-credit limit of $70 (35 percentof $200).
If the firm pays foreign income taxesof less than $70, then the firm wifi
be entitled to claim foreign tax creditsfor all of its foreign taxes paid. If,
however, the firm pays $90 of foreign taxes,then it wifi be permitted to
claim no more than $70 of foreign taxcredits.
Taxpayers whose foreign tax paymentsexceed the foreign tax credit
limit are said to have excess foreigntax credits; the excess foreign tax
credits represent the portion of theirforeign tax payments that exceed
the U.S. tax liabifities generated bytheir foreign incomes. Taxpayers
whose foreign tax payments aresmaller than their foreign-tax-credit
limits are said to be in excesslimit or to have deficit foreign tax credits.
American law permits taxpayers to use excessforeign tax credits in one
year to reduce their U.S. taxobligations on foreign-source income in
either of the two previous years or in anyof the following five years.'7
15In spite of these provisions it appears thatAmerican multinationals selectively repatri-
ate profits from foreign affiliates based on taxconsiderations. See the evidence reported in
Hines and Hubbard (1990), Altshulerand Newlon (1993), Altshuler, Newlon, andRan-
dolph (1995), and Hines (1999b).
16Subpart F income consists of income from passiveinvestments (such as interest and
dividends received from investments in securities),foreign-base-company income (that
arises from using a foreign affffiate as aconduit for certain types of international transac-
tions), income that is invested in United Statesproperty, money used offshore to insure
risks in the United States, and moneyused to pay bribes to foreign government officials.
American firms with foreign subsidiaries that earnprofits through most types of active
business operations and that subsequentlyreinvest those profits in active lines of busi-
ness, are not subject to theSubpart F rules, and are therefore able to deferU.S. tax liability
on their foreign profits untilthey choose to remit dividends at a laterdate.
17Foreign tax credits are not adjusted for inflation, sothey are generally the most valuable
if claimed as soon as possible. Barringunusual circumstances, firms apply their foreign taxThe Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentivesand the Income Tax51
In practice, the calculation of theforeign-tax-credit limit entails certain
additional complications, notableamong which is that total worldwide
foreign income is used to calculate thelimit. This method of calculating
the foreign-tax-credit limit is knownas worldwide averaging. A tax-
payer has excess foreign tax credits if thesum of worldwide foreign
income tax payments exceeds this limit.The combination of worldwide
averaging and selective repatriation ofdividends from subsidiaries
located in countries with differingtax rates implies that theaverage
foreign tax rate used to calculate theforeign-tax-credit limit need not
equal the average foreign tax rate facedby a firm's foreign affiliates.18
The ability of multinational firms to adjustthe amount of foreign income
received in non-dividend forms (suchas interest and royalties) contrib-
utes to their control over whetheror not they have excess foreign tax
credits.19 This flexibility is furtherenhanced by the source rules dis-
cussed in the next subsection.
2.2.4 Source Rules and Excess CreditsFirms with excess foreign tax
credits benefit whenever theycan treat income earned by activities
undertaken in the United Statesas having a foreign source for pur-
poses of U.S. income taxation, since those firmsare effectively untaxed
on such income. The benefit to a firm withexcess foreign tax credits of
allocating income to foreignsource is illustrated by the comparison
presented in Table 1. The American multinationalfirm in this example
earns $40 by exporting from the United States andan additional $100
from the operations of its foreign affiliate.The affiliate is located ina
country with a 50-percent tax rate, which, sinceit exceeds the U.S. tax
rate of 35 percent, implies that theparent company has $15 of excess
foreign tax credits. If export profitsare treated as domestic income,
then the firm's $40 of export incomeis fully taxed at the domestic tax
rate of 35 percent, resulting ina tax liability of $14. If instead the
credits against future years only when unableto apply them against either of the previous two years.
Firms paying the corporate alternative minimumtax (AMT) are subject to the same rules, with the added restriction that the combinationof net operating loss deductions and
foreign tax credits cannot reduce AMT liabilities bymore than 90 percent. It is noteworthy
that, since the AMT rate is only 20percent, firms subject to the AMT are considerablymore likely to have excess foreign tax credits thanare firms that pay the regular corporate tax.
18Average foreign income tax rates paid by foreign affiliatesreflect investment decisions as
well as transfer pricing practices that affect the locationof reported taxable income. There
is ample evidence, surveyed by Hines (1999a),that both types of decisions are sensitiveto their tax implications.
19Hines (1994, 1995) and Grubert (1998) offer evidencethat foreign-source interest and
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exporter can characterize 50 percent ofexport profits as having foreign
source, then $7 of the firm's excess foreigntax credits can be applied
against the U.S. tax liabilityon export profits, leaving a net tax liability
of $7 on export profits. Animportant aspect of this benefitis that foreign governments donot coordinate their taxation ofexport income with the United States. Thus,the election by an Americantaxpayer to treat $20 of export profits arisingfrom sales to Italyas having foreign
source for U.S. tax purposes wifi haveno effect on any Italian taxes that
the taxpayer mayowe.
U.S. tax law embodies thecurious principle that the locationof income arising from a sale is determined,in part, by the site of the salerather than the site of production. Fora firm with minimal production activities
in the United States and sellingonly for export, allor most of its income
can be characterized as foreign income undersection 862 of the Internal
Revenue Code. If this firm ispart of a controlled group withexcess foreign tax credits, then thisfirm's profits from exports wifi beentirely untaxed by the United States.2° Mostexporters produce some of their
export property (rather than simply buyingand selling goods forex- port), and under U.S. law thenhave a combination of domesticand foreign income. For thesetaxpayers, Section 863(b) of the InternalReve- nue Code provides that half of export-relatedprofits wifi be deemed to
have foreign source if thetaxpayer arranges to pass theexport title in the foreign location rather thanin the United States. Therefore,firms with
excess foreign tax credits are eligible to avoidU.S. taxation of 50 percent
of their export profits by takingadvantage of the opportunityprovided under section 863(b).
2.3 Incentives for Exporters
American exportersare faced with the enviable choice betweentwo
export subsidies: the partial exemption ofexport income earned usingan FSC, and the allocation of halfof export income to foreignsource under
section 863(b). For firms with deficitforeign tax credits, theexport source rules do not offer theprospect of reduced U.S. tax liabilities,since in- come allocated to foreign source isnonetheless immediately taxable by
the United States. Such firmsdo better to route theirexports through FSCs, in which case theyare eligible for a iS-percent exclusion ofexport
20 It is not known to whatextent American exporters use suchdomestically-located foreign sales subsidiaries to allocate 100percent of export income to foreignsource. While strict application of arm's-length pricing betweena domestic producer and a domestically- located foreign sales subsidiary wouldnegate such benefits, it is also not clear howclosely transfer pricing within the U.S. is monitored.54Desai & Hines
Subsidy by Exemption: FSC
Texas
GuamV Italy
ApproximatelY 15% of profits
exempt due to allocation of
profits to FSC and 15/23
exemption
Available to most firms
Subsidy by Allocation: 863(b)
Texas
Italy
50% of profits allocated to
foreign source and these
profits face no taxation if
exporter has excess foreign
tax credits
Valuable only to firms with





40% of profits exempt due
to full use of FSCs (15%)
and partial use of 863(b)
(25% = 50% >< 50%)
Available to all firms
but full advantage only
to firms with excess
foreign tax credits
Requires creation of FSC
Requires creation of FSC
FIGURE 1. Overview of Incentivesfor Exporters
profits from U.S. taxation.2' Firmswith excess foreign tax creditsmini
mize their taxes byavoiding the use of FSCsaltogether, and instead
using 863(b) to allocate50 percent of export profits toforeign source,
since doing so effectivelyexcludes 50 percent of exportprofits from U.S.
taxation.
The first two columns of Figure1 summarize the relevantdifferences
between the exemption andallocation methods ofsubsidizing exports
for a Texan manufacturerexporting a computer to anItalian customer.
Regardless of a firm'sexcess_foreign-tax-credit status, a 15-percent ex-
emption of export profits isavailable through the creation of anFSC and
the routing of exportsthrough the FSC. In contrast,if the exporter is a
multinational firm with excess foreigntax credits, 50 percentof export
profits can escape taxationthrough the use of 863(b). Thefinal column of
Figure 1 outlines theinteraction of these provisionsand is discussed in
Section 3.2.
There is an important complicationto this otherwisesimple story,
stemming from the factthat a firm's excessforeigntax-creditstatus
changes over time and isitself a function of many decisionsthat the firm
makes every year. Suchdecisions include where to locateforeign opera-
tions, whether to financeforeign operations with debt orequity, how
21 Firms with very low profit margins ontheir exports can exclude up to 30 percentof their
export profits from U.S. taxationby electing to determine FSC incomewith the 1.83-
percent rule. Firms have incentivesto make this election wheneverexport profits represent
less than 7.96 percent of exportsales prices.
50%
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many dividends to repatriate from each of its foreign subsidiaries,and
what costs (such as interestexpenses or R&D expenses) the firm wifi
incur in the United States and allocate in part against foreignincome. As
a result, the distinction between a firm with excess foreign tax credits
and one with deficit foreign tax credits is perhapsmore a matter of
degree, reflecting different circumstances and incentives,than it is a
stark characteristic of a firm carrying clear-cut implications.Since excess
foreign tax credits can be carried back twoyears and forward five, a
firm's excess-foreign-tax-credit status ina given year is less consequen-
tial than the pattern of its foreign tax creditsover time and the costs it
incurs in taking the actions necessary to change its status.22
3. HISTORY OF U.S. EXPORT SUBSIDIES
The United States has a long history of providingtax subsidies for Ameri-
can exports.23 This section recounts the history of U.S. export subsidies
provided by the exemption of export profits, subsidies providedby the
allocation of export profit to foreign-source income, and therecent con-
troversy over the compatibility of FSCs with WTO rules. Thishistory of
export subsidies is also mapped out in Table 2.
3.1 Tax Exemptions for Export Profits
The original idea behind exempting export profits fromU.S. taxation
was to encourage trade with strategically important parts of the world.
The Revenue Act of 1939 authorized the creation of Chinatrade corpora-
tions, which permitted taxpayers to exclude from U.S.tax a fraction of
profits earned on exports to China. The Revenue Act of1942 authorized
the creation of Western Hemisphere trade corporations,which similarly
exempted from U.S. taxation a fraction of profits earnedon trade within
the Western Hemisphere.
In practice, exporters could frequently generate theirown export tax
incentives by routing exports through sales affiliates locatedin offshore
tax havens. With adept use of transfer pricing,24a fraction of export
See, for example, Scholes and Wolfson (1992) foran analysis of the costs and benefits of
undertaking actions that affect foreign-tax-credit status.
See Hufbauer (1992) for an interpretive survey of the history ofAmerican export
subsidies.
24 There is controversyover the extent to which American companies can reduce their tax
obligations by adjusting transfer prices on transactions between membersof a controlled
group U.S. law, and the laws of most industrialized countries, requires taxpayersto use
arm's-length prices in transactions between related parties. Arm's-lengthprices are diffi-
cult to establish for many transactions, however, leavingtaxpayers some latitude in setting56Desai & Hines
TABLE 2
History of U.S. Export Incentives
Subsidy by exemption Subsidy by allocation




1954, 1957Use of independent
factory prices (1FF) or 50/50 allocation
1962Subpart F Rules
1971Creation of DISCs
1972EC complaint to GATT
1976, 1982Reduction of DISC bene-
fits and GATT rulings
1984Initiation of FSCs and IC-DISCs
1986Cut in corporate tax rate
1988Regulations issued to tighten
use of 1FF
1993Court decisions backing 50/50
allocation
1997WTO complaint
profits could be attributed to the sales affiliates,thereby removing
this fraction from the taxable income of the parent company.If the sales
affiliate is located in a jurisdiction with low or zero taxes,then its profits
are untaxed. The introductionof the U.S. Subpart F rules in 1962 threat-
ened to reduce greatly the value of this tax-avoidanceopportunity on the
part of exporters, since profits earned byforeign sales affiliates are sub-
ject to immediate U.S. taxation under SubpartF. As a result, the 1962
transfer prices. Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice(1994), and Clausing (2001),
among others, offer evidence that theprofitability and trade patterns of the foreign affifi-
ates of American companies are consistent withtax-motivated adjustment of international
transfer prices.The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentivesand the Income Tax57
legislation permitted taxpayersto route exports through export trade
corporations, the income of which is not subjectto immediate U.S. taxa-
tion as long as this income doesnot exceed 150 percent of exportpromo-
tion expenses (or 10 percent ofgross receipts, whichever is less). Further-
more, export trade corporations are required to reinvesttheir profits in
export trade assets in order to continue to deferU.S. tax obligations. Due
to these requirements, and the attractive alternativesavailable to Ameri-
can exporters, export trade corporations are seldom used.
Concern over the languid performanceof American exports led Con-
gress in 1971 to establish domestic international salescorporations
(DISCs). A certain fraction ofexport profits could be allocated to the DISC
rather than the domestic exporter. Theincome of a DISC was tax-exempt
until distributed to its domesticparent company, and DISCs werere-
quired under the 1971 legislation to distributeonly half of their profits.
The remaining half of DISC profits couldtherefore be deferred from U.S.
taxation indefinitely. Exporters could chooseamong three alternatives in
assigning export profits to the DISC: 50percent of export profits, 4 per-
cent of gross export sales,or those profits that could be justifiedon
the basis of arm's-length pricing betweenthe exporter and its DISC.25 The
third of these alternativeswas of course very seldom used, given the
inabffity to justify large DISC profits basedon the economic activity under-
taken by DISCs. Of the first two, the50-percent method was the election
of choice for most exports. Together,the 50-percent method of determin-
ing DISC profits and the 50-percent distributionrequirement implied that
25 percent of export profits could beexempt from domestic taxation.
In response to budgetarypressures, Congress subsequently reduced
the tax subsidy available from routingexports through DISCs. The Tax
Reform Act of 1976 permittedtaxpayers to claim deductions only for
exports in excess of firm-specific targets equalto 67 percent of average
exports in the preceding four years. The Tax Equityand Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982 further reducedDISC benefits by requiring DISCsto
distribute to their taxable parents 57.5percent of income, leaving only
42.5 percent available for indefinite deferral.
Unfortunately for the DISCprogram, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), of which the UnitedStates was a member, proscribed
export subsidies, including tax subsidies taking theform of reduced in-
come taxes on export profits. The European Community fileda complaint
with the GATT over the DISCprogram in July 1972. The United States
responded by filing a complaint with GATTagainst Belgium, France and
Of course, the law contained many details beyondthese, for example permitting taxpay-
ers to augment DISC profits by 10 percent of export promotionexpenses.58Descii & Hines
the Netherlands, claiming thatthe tax systems of those countriesindi-
rectly allowed exporters to avoiddomestic tax on export profits by using
transfer prices to shift export profits intoforeign sales subsidiaries located
in tax havens. In November 1976,GATT panels issued reports finding
that the DISC program, as well asthe European tax practices, violated
GATT rules. The GATT membershipaccepted these findings in Decem-
ber 1981, subject to the qualificationsthat home countries are entitled to
provide double-tax relief for foreignincome taxes paid, including the
exemption of foreign profits from home-countrytaxation, as long as inter-
national transactions are based onarm's-length prices. The United States
maintained that these qualifications impliedthat the DISC was permissi-
ble under GATT rules, butacknowledged that continuing its DISC pro-
gram in the wake ofthe GATT ruling had the effect ofundermining
GATT. In October 1982 the UnitedStates announced its intention to
eliminate the DISC program, and did soin creating FSCs with the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984.26 FSCs werefashioned to require more extensive
foreign activity than DISCs in the hopethat their foreign presence would
blunt GATT criticism of the program.
3.2 Export Source Rules
The allocation of export profits betweendomestic and foreign sources
was originally codifiedby the Revenue Act of 1918,which provided that
all export profits represent foreign-sourceincome as long as the relevant
marketing activity takes place abroad.The Tax Reform Act of 1954, and
subsequent Treasury regulations in 1957,imposed a new requirement
that taxpayers use "independentfactory prices" to determine the loca-
tion of export profits. Exportersselling goods for which arm's-length
(independent factory) prices areavailable must use such prices to deter-
mine the amount of export profit.Thus, an exporter producing agood in
the United States for $200 andselling it abroad for $280 might use a
comparable good selling for $250 toestablish an independent factory
price. Consequently, $50 of theassociated export profit would be as-
signed to domestic source, and $30 to foreign source.In the (large num-
ber of) cases for which suchindependent factory prices do not exist, or
arguably do not exist, taxpayers withdomestic and foreign income were
entitled to allocate half of export profits toforeign source, provided only
that the title to the export propertypassed hands in the foreign location.
As a practical matter, exporters weregenerally able to allocate to foreign
source half of their exportincome.
The 1984 Act provided that undistributedDISC income as of the end of 1984 was tobe
distributed to parent companies without anyaccompanying tax obligation of the recipients.The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentives and the Income Tax59
The 1986 U.S. tax rate reduction increased the numbers oftaxpayers
with excess foreign tax credits and impelled the U.S. Treasuryto issue
regulations in 1988 and 1989 intended to limit the benefits available from
allocating export profits to foreign source. Thesenew regulations tight-
ened the requirement that taxpayers use independent factoryprices to
determine export profits that are subject to allocation under Section
863(b). The regulations gave taxpayers the alternative of routingexports
through an FSC, in which case full FSC benefitswere available, plus the
taxpayer could subject half of export profits to the 50-50 split under
Section 863(b). This alternative would effectively exempt fromU.S. taxa-
tion 40 percent of the export profits of firms withexcess foreign tax
credits, since 863(b) treatment of half of export profits makes25 percent
foreign-source income, to which can be added the 15-percent FSCexemp-
tion. While exporters selling goods for which thereare no obvious mar-
ket comparables might do better by determining thesource of all export
profits according to independent factory prices, the Treasurystrongly
hinted its willingness to confront such elections. This alternativeis sum-
marized in the final colunm of Figure 1.
Taxpayers nonetheless eagerly continued to allocate half ofexport
income to foreign source under Section 863(b), which led to high-profile
court confrontations with the Treasury and ultimately a retreaton the
part of the U.S. government.27 Court decisions in 1993, along with 1997
Treasury regulations, confirmed the ability of exporters to allocate halfof
export profits to foreign source. While confrontations with the Treasury
were no longer a threat, taxpayers continued to have the option of
routing exports through FSCs while jointly allocating half ofexport prof-
its through 863(b).
3.3 The WTO Controversy
Ongoing trade disputes between the United States and Europe tookan
interesting turn on November 18, 1997, when the European Union
In a 1991 opinion, the Tax Court originally sided with the IRS interpretation of the 863(b)
statute requiring the use of independent factory prices, but two important 1993cases were
decided in favor of taxpayers taking liberal interpretations of the statute. As U.S. Treasury
official Rousslang (1994, p. 1049) commented at the time, "The possibility that thetaxpayer
may be forced to use an independent factory price appears to have been significantly
reduced, however, by recent court findings in Intel v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No.39 (June
28, 1993). The finding appears to require the U.S. parent to sell theexports through a
foreign branch before it is required to use an independent factory price. Fewexports are
sold through foreign branches; most are sold to foreign subsidiariesor to unrelated par-
ties." Macdonald (1999, p. 470) notes later that "As a practical matter, the 1993 Inteland
Phillips decisions left taxpayers with a choice of methods [including the 50-50profit split
method] because they could typically structure their transactions to avoidcreating an
independent factory price."60Desai & Hines
lodged a complaint with the WTO alleging that theAmerican FSC pro-
gram represented an ifiegal exportsubsidy. Contemporaneous observers
noted that the European complaint represented aretaliation for success-
ful American claims that European import regimesfor bananas and
hormone-treated beef violated WTO rules. The original FSCcomplaint
was followed by inconclusiveconsultations between the United States
and the European Union on December 17, 1997, andcontinued unfruit-
ful consultations on February 10, 1998. On July 23,1999 the WTO's
Dispute Resolution Panel issued its interim reportstating that the Ameri-
can FSC program violated WTOrules. The July 23 report also indicated
that the United States would be required to rescind itsFSC provisions by
October 1, 2000 or else face retaliatory penalties. Followingthe appear-
ance of the interim report, theEuropean Union and the United States
together requested on August 6, 1999 that the panel reviewthe precise
aspects of the interim report. The WTO'sfinal ruling against the United
States appeared on September 17, 1999.
On October 28, 1999, the United States indicated itsintention to ap-
peal the WTO's report, and filed a formal notice ofappeal. The U.S.
appeal was withdrawn on November 2, 1999, but refiled onNovember
26, 1999. Following rounds of submissions byall parties to the dispute,
as well as oral hearings, theWTO formally ruled on the legality of FSCs
on February 24, 2000,finding that the FSC program violates WTO rules
and must be replaced by October 1, 2000.
The American response came quickly. On February28, 2000 American
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summerssaid that the United States
would not abandon its program of subsidizing exports,and would in-
stead start consultations with the European Union todetermine appro-
priate compensation. On April 7, 2000, theUnited States informed the
Dispute Resolution body of its intention toimplement its recommenda-
tions consistently with WTO obligations. Finally, onSeptember 13, 2000,
the House of Representatives voted in favorof legislation (H.R. 4986, the
FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income ExclusionAct of 2000) that would
effectively retain current export subsidies while addingsmall subsidies
for sales by foreign affiliates of Americanmultinational corporations.
4. THE MAGNITUDE OF TAXINCENTIVES FOR
U.S. EXPORTS
This section profiles the magnitude and scope of taxincentives for Ameri-
can exporters over the last twodecades. Accordingly, it captures two ma-
jor events in the legislative history ofinternational taxation and export
subsidies: the repeal of the DISC provisions in 1984,and the passage ofThe Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentives and theIncome Tax61
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which reducedU.S. tax rates and thereby in-
creased the likelihood that an American multinationalfirm had excess for-
eign tax credits. In describing thescope of export incentives, this section
separately considers exemption of export profits throughdistinct entities
(DISCs, IC-DISCs, and FSCs) and subsidiesthrough interactions between
export source rules and the foreign tax credits [863(b)allocations].
4.1 DISCs, IC-DISCs, and FSCs
Table 3 and Figure 2 present availableinformation on numbers and
activities of DISCs, IC-DISCs, and FSCs used byAmerican taxpayers in
1980, 1983, 1987, 1992, and 1996 by industrycategory.28 Data for 1980
and 1983 report the activities of DISCs, while datafor subsequent years
report the total activity of FSCs and IC-DISCs together.29In 1996, Ameri-
can taxpayers used 5,136 FSCs and IC-DISCs toexport goods worth
$290.5 billion. Eighty-nine percent of thoseentities and 86 percent of
those exports were in manufacturing industriesin 1996. The prevalence
of FSCs and IC-DISCs can be expressedas the share of all U.S. exports
that employ these entities. In 1996, 49.8percent of all U.S. exports
passed through these entities. Theiruse is more prevalent in the non-
manufacturing sector, where 71.5percent of exports employ these en-
tities, while only 47.2 percent of manufacturedexports employ them.3°
Within manufacturing, the usage of FSCs andIC-DISCs appears heavily
weighted toward four sectorschemicals,non-electrical machinery,
electrical machinery and electronics, andtransportation equipment.
The dynamics of the use of these distinctexport entities suggests that
the repeal of the DISC legislation in 1984 hada large impact on U.S.
exporters. From 1983 to 1987, the number ofexport entities fell by 60.7
percent and the volume of exports passing through theseentities fell by
36.7 percent. This drop in exports employingFSCs and IC-DISCs was
more pronounced in non-manufactured products, where therewas a
67.1-percent reduction between 1983 and 1987.While the number of
export-vehicle tax returns within manufacturedproducts dropped by
60.7 percent, the total value of exports employingthese entities dropped
by only 26.9 percent, suggesting that smallerexporters were less likely to
replace DISCs with FSCs and IC-DISCsimmediately. Finally, the share
of all U.S. exports employing theseexport vehicles dropped from 70.9 to
Data for FSC usage are only available foryears 1987, 1992, and 1996. DISC data are
available more regularly prior to the repeal of the DISClegislation in 1984.
For 1992, data represent the sum of FSC activity in 1992and IC-DISC activity in 1991.
Non-manufacturing industries that employ FSCs includeagricultural services, computer
software, and leasing services.62Desai & Hines
TABLE 3
The Use of DISCs, FSCs, and IC-DISCsfrom 1980 to 1996 b Industry
Number of returns Change (%)
Note: For 1980 and 1983, data represent totalnumbers of DISC returns. For 1987, 1992 and 1996,data
represent the numbers of FSC and IC-DISC returnscombined. For 1992, data represent numbers of
IC-DISC returns for 1991 plus 1992 FSC returns. Thelast two columns present the percentage change
from 1983 to 1987 and from 1987 to 1996.
Sources: Belmonte (2000), Holik (1995, 1997), and U.S.Treasury (1988, 1992).
36.0 percent between 1983 and1987, with the non-manufacturing sector
dropping from 93.2 to 31.5 percentand the manufacturing sector drop-
ping from 65.8 to 36.8 percent.Thus, the repeal of the DISC legislation
appears to have had a sizableimpact on U.S. exporters andparticularly
smaller U.S. exporters. This link betweenthe repeal of DISC and subse-
quent U.S. export performance isexplored further in section 5.1. Sub-
sequent to 1987, and particularlyafter 1992, the frequency of FSC and
IC-DISC use by exporters has grownconsiderably and is approaching
the 1983 DISC level.
Industry 1980198319871992199683-8787-96
Total 8,6659,6633,7984,0535,136-60.7 35.2
Non-manufactured products 1,0521,073 419 437 560-61.0 33.7
Manufactured products 7,6138,5893,3793,5254,557-60.7 34.9
Food and kindred products 336 352 198 187 160-43.8-19.2
Tobacco manufactures 12 20 10 12 10-50.0 0.0
Textile mill products 284 263 50 58 72-81.0 44.0
Apparel, etc.















Furniture and fixtures 42 39 27 28 39-30.8 44.4
Paper and affied products 160 184 70 72 66-62.0-5.7
Printing and publishing, etc. 126 122 74 43 79-39.3 6.8
Chemicals and allied products 621 625 219 302 334-65.0 52.5
Rubber and misc. plastics
products
162 282 82 45 126-70.9 53.7
Leather and leather products 79 43 32 32 36-25.6 12.5
Stone, clay, glass, and con-
crete products
78 78 29 48 51-62.8 75.9
Primary metal industries 281 222 111 106 165-50.0 48.6
Fabricated metal products 773 820 230 239 331-72.0 43.9
Machinery, except electrical 1,4481,467 525 622 984-64.2 87.4
Electrical machinery and
equipment
1,3541,655 745 708 835-55.0 12.1
Transportation equipment 441 537 251 294 486-53.3 93.6
Professional and scientific in-
strumentS
439 636 313 350 322-50.8 2.9








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The evolution of FSC usage is explored further in Figure3 and Table 4.
Figure 3 illustrates that the upward surge innumbers of FSCs did not
begin until the early 1990s. Information on numbersof FSCs is available
on an annual frequency,making it possible to depict the growth of FSC
usage, as in Figure 3. Of course,changes in the number of FSCs need not
coincide with important changes in the economicinfluence of the FSC
program, since major exporters are verylikely to have availed them-
selves of the advantages of the FSC program from itsinception.
Table 4 provides details on the location, pricingmethods, and parental
characteristics of FSCs. FSCs are high concentrated infive attractive
foreign locationsthe U.S. Virgin Islands,Barbados, Guam, Jamaica,
and the Netherlandswhich together account for 95.0percent of FSC
tax returns and 95.3 percent of exportreceipts in 1996. While the U.S.
Virgin Islands continues to be the mostpopular location for an FSC,
Barbados appears to have attracted larger exporters in recent years.
The pricing methods chosen by FSCs exhibitdifferences based on sizes
of exporters. In 1996, exclusive usage of eitherthe 1.83-percent gross-
receipts method or the 23-percent combined-taxable-incomemethod ac-
counted for 73.6 percent of FSC tax returns but only29.8 percent of export
receipts. Larger exporters show signs ofopportunistically employing
combinations of pricing methods, as 17.6 percentof returns and 59.6
percent of exports employ combinations of thegross-receipts, combined-
taxable-income, and marginal-costing methods. Theimportance of large
exporters in understanding the impact of the FSC programis underscored
by the fact that parents with over $1 billion in assetsaccount for only 16.3
percent of FSC returns but 74.3 percent of export grossreceipts. Table 5
further details the usage of FSCs by size of parent assets.While most
corporations use only one FSC, large parents appear to use morethan one
FSC.31 Overall, 29.2 percent of all non-financialcorporations with assets
of more than $250 million employ FSCs, furtherindicating the dominance
of large firms as FSC users.
4.2 Source Rules and the Use of 863(b)
Figure 4 provides details on the magnitude of exportsubsidies that were
derived through the use of foreign-source allocationrules by U.S. export-
ers in 1980, 1984, 1990, 1992,and 1996.32 In 1996, $27.4 billion of export
income was treated as foreign-source incomeunder 863(b). Figure 4 also
31The use of more than one FSC by a single firm is commonlythe short-term result of a
merger between two companies, each ofwhich has an FSC.
32Data on 863(b) allocations are provided in the CorporateForeign Tax Credit data releases
provided in the SQl Bulletin Prior to 1992, these releases arebiannual; after 1992 they are



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentivesand the Income Tax69
present ratios of 863(b) income to total taxable foreignprofits, showing
that, in 1996, 863(b) allocationsrepresented 18.9 percent of foreign tax-
able profits. While manufacturingaccounted for 66.4 percent of total
863(b) income, the transportation andFIRE sectors accounted for 17.4
and 10.9 percent of the income allocated.As is also true of FSCusage in
the manufacturing sector, 863(b)manufacturing income is highlycon-
centrated in chemicals, electronics, instruments,and motor vehicles.
Industry figures for 1990, 1992, and 1996,not reported here, suggest that
exporters are opportunistic in theirusage of 863(b) allocations, as usage
varies considerably from year toyear.
Despite these year-to-year variations,it is clear that the period from
1984 to 1990 representsa dramatic change in the use of 863(b) alloca-
tions. Across all sectors, gross 863(b)income grew almost ninefold, and
manufacturing 863(b) allocationgrew almost sevenfold, from 1984 to
1990. As a share of foreign taxable income,863(b) allocations grew from
3.7 to 22.5 percent between 1984 and1990 across all sectors, and from
4.92 to 20.29 percent in manufacturing.Across most sectors, the share of
taxable income represented by 863(b)allocations reached a peak in 1992
and receded slightly by 1996.
This trend in use of 863(b) allocationscan be at least partly explained
by the overall trend in theexcess-foreign-tax-credit status of American
multinationals. The Tax Reform Act of 1986(TRA) reduced the U.S.
corporate statutory tax rate from 46 to 34percent, forcing a number of
U.S. multinationals intoexcess-foreign-tax-credit status. Accordingly,
the appeal of using 863(b) allocationsgrew considerably after TRA and
would have dominated the use of FSCs forany firm with excess foreign
tax credits. Since electing to allocateexport income entirely through
863(b) prevents the use of FSCs, the relativelylimited growth of FSCs
from 1987 through the early 1990sis consistent with incentives created
by the increasing incidence ofexcess credit status. After the early 1990s,
FSCs resumed their rapid growth,suggesting, along with other evi-
dence, that U.S. multinationalswere less likely to have excess foreign
tax credits by the early 1990s.
The relative importance of FSCs, IC-DISCs,and the 863(b) source alloca-
tion rules for U.S. exporters is exploredin Table 6 for manufacturing
The comparability of this data acrossyears is limited by a reporting change between 1984
and 1990. Specifically, figures for 1980 and1984 represent net 863(b) allocations after
deductions while figures for 1990, 1992 and 1996are gross 863(b) allocations. Conversa-
tions with IRS officials and filers suggest that thereexists considerable confusion about
what relevant deductions are for 863(b) income.Nonetheless, consideration of definitely
allocable deductions in years after 1990 doesnot mitigate the conclusion that 863(b) activity






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentivesand the Income Tax71
TABLE 6
The Prevalence of Export Subsidies inManufacturing Exports,
1992 and 1996
Note: Dollar figures are millions of current dollars. Totalmanufacturing exports represents exports for all U.S. manufacturers. FSC/IC-DISC exportgross receipts is total exports for FSCs and IC-DISCs
combined. FSC/IC-DISC share is the ratio of FSC/IC-DISCexport gross receipts to total manufacturing
exports. FSC manufacturing net exempt income is theexport profit that is not taxed due to the use of a FSC. Corresponding FSC export profits is FSC netexempt income divided by 15 percent and
represents total FSC export profits. 863(b) income jointly employingFSCs is corresponding FSC export profits divided by four according to the assumption thathalf of FSC export profits employ jointuse of 863(b). Total 863(b) income allocation represents totalmanufacturing 863(b) income. 863(b) income exclusively employing 863(b) is the difference betweentotal 863(b) income allocation and 863(b)
income jointly employing FSCs. SQl pretax margin formanufacturing is the ratio of pretax profits to business receipts for all manufacturing firms. Corresponding863(b) exports is 863(b) income exclu-
sively employing 863(b) multiplied by two and dividedby the SQl pretax margin for manufacturing.
863(b) share is the ratio of corresponding 863(b)exports to total manufacturing exports.
Source: Belmonte (2000), Holik (1995, 1997), andunpublished calculations furnished by the Internal Revenue Service.
exports. While FSC data provide export receiptfigures, isolating the ex-
ports that employ 863(b) is complicated bytwo factors. First, if taxpayers
make joint use of FSCs and 863(b)as described above, then income allo-
cated to 863(b) does not representexports that uniquely use 863(b)as an
export subsidy. Second, data are available forthe income allocated
through 863(b) but not for the correspondingexports. In order to circum-
vent these difficulties, the calculations reportedin this table presume that
half of all FSC exporters jointlyuse 863(b) and that the profitability
1992 1996
Total manufacturing exports $383,082 $530,484
FSC/IC-DISC export gross receipts $139,387 $250,650
FSCIIC-DISC share 36.39% 47.25%
FSC manufacturing net exempt income $3,615 $7,368
Corresponding FSC export profits $24,100 $49,120
863(b) income jointly employing FSCs $6,025 $12,280
Total 863(b) income allocation $13,145 $18,229
863(b) income exclusively employing 863(b) $7,120 $5,949
SOT pretax margin for manufacturing 6.19% 8.20%
Corresponding 863(b) exports $230,048 $145,098
863(b) share 60.05% 27.35%72Desai & Hines
of 863(b) exports is represented by theoverall profitability of U.S. manu-
facturing firms.Table 6 shows that, under these assumptions,863(b)
was the dominant exportsubsidy for manufacturers in 1992,covering
more than 60 percentof their exports. By 1996, however, therelative use
of FSCs had increased substantially.
4.3 The Revenue Impact of FSCsand 863(b)
Figure 5 provides official estimatesof the actual and projected tax expendi-
tures for the FSC and 863(b) exportsubsidies from 1985 to 2005.While
the tax expenditures related toFSCs reported in Figure 5 follow a steady
upward trend, tax expendituresassociated with 863(b) allocations are
reported only after 1985 and dominate FSCexpenditures until 1993. Begin-
ning in 1993, 863(b) expendituresdrop precipitously, and subsequently
follow a more orderly pace, suggesting achange in estimating methodol-
ogy. By 2005, FSCs areestimated to constitute an annual tax expenditure
of $5.5 billion, while the 863(b) sourceallocation rules are estimated to
constitute an annual tax expenditure of$1.6 billion. For the five years from
1995 to 2000, the combination of the two programsprovided tax expendi-
tures that grew at acompound annual rate of 13 percent.
The methodology employed by theU.S. Treasury to calculate the fig-
ures reported in Figure5 may considerably underestimate the tax expen-
ditures associated with thesesubsidies, particularly the subsidy implicit
in the 863(b) allocation rules.36 Thepotential understatement of the tax
expenditures for export tax subsidies is apparentfrom the magnitude of
The actual figures for the joint use of FSCsand 863(b) are not known.
For the purpose of these estimates, "taxexpenditures" consist of tax revenue forgone
due to the provision of special export taxincentives.
The values of these tax subsidies are calculatedby using actual tax returns to evaluate
the changes in tax liabilities that would accompanyrepeal of the FSC or 863(b) provisions,
assuming that taxpayer behavior did notrespond to the changes. Also, the calculated
revenue effects of the subsidiesignore the implicit values of excess-tax-credit carry-
forwards and other intertemporally dependent taxcharacteristics. Since a firm's excess-
foreign-tax-credit status is, to a certain degree, a functionof its endogenous decisions, and
since foreign-tax-credit carryforwardsand carrybacks are valuable to firms that anticipate
changes in the future, it follows that it wouldbe a mistake to attribute zero value to 863(b)
allocations made by firms with deficit foreign taxcredits in the current yearyet that is
what the official budget figures do. Since rational taxpayerswho appear to have deficit
foreign tax credits always have the optionof routing their exports through FSCs, it follows
that they would not elect to allocate all of their exportprofits through 863(b) unless by
doing so they anticipate receiving tax benefits atleast as great as those available from using
FSCs. Rousslang (1994) describes the U.S.Treasury's method of calculating the revenue
cost of the 863(b) sales source rules. Thesecalculations have been criticized by Hufbauer
and DeRosa (1997) on the grounds that theyfail to incorporate the beneficial revenue




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































863(b) income, which is $27.4billion in 1996 (the last year forwhich
figures are available). If taxpayersusing 863(b) were able to takefull tax
advantage of their allocations,then the tax benefit associatedwith this
allocation would equal ($27.4billion)(O.35), or $9.6 billion.37 This upper
bound for the impact of 863(b) contrastswith an official estimate of $1.4
billion as the 1996 revenue costof the 863(b) provision, Of course,not all
firms that allocate export incomeagainst foreign source are able tobene-
fit from this allocation, eitherbecause they have net operatinglosses for
tax purposes and are thereforeeffectively exempt from taxation, orbe-
cause they have deficitforeign tax credits.38'39
While $9.6 bfflion represents an upperbound on the 1996 expenditure
associated with 863(b), it is alsopossible to establish a lower bound on
863(b) expenditures. Firms electingto allocate income to foreign source
under 863(b) rather than use anFSC must anticipate greaterbenefits
from the former than from the latter.Consequently, it is possible to infer
a lower bound to thebenefits that exporters anticipatedfrom the export
source rules in 1996by calculating the tax savingsavailable by using
FSCs rather than 863(b). FSCs offerthe prospect of excluding at least15
This calculation is based on the U.S. statutorycorporate income tax rate of 35 percent. It
is important to note that, in 1996, taxpayersclaimed $10.0 billion of "definitely allocable
deductions" against their gross 863(b) incomeof $27.4 billion, making a net 863(b) income
of $17.5 billion. Unfortunately, theambiguous nature of these deductionsspecifically,
what it is that taxpayers do, and think thatthey should, include among such deductions
makes it very difficult to know the extent towhich it is appropriate to reduce gross863(b)
income in calculating the net taxbenefit. We are grateful to various U.S. Treasuryand IRS
officials in drawing attention to the problemof identifying the magnitude ofactual net
863(b) income. In calculating the upperbound on 863(b) tax benefits, we do notconsider
reported definitely allocable deductions.
There is a separate issue that featuresprominently in government calculations but that is
unlikely to change the interpretationof the calculations that follow. Allocationsof income
against foreign source using Section863(b) typically triggers an automaticallocation of
various expenses (such as interest chargesand R&D expenses) likewise againstforeign
source. This expense allocationdoes not affect the tax liabilities of taxpayerswith deficit
foreign tax credits, but wifi modestlyaffect the tax liabilities of taxpayers with excess
foreign tax credits.
In the absence of perfect knowledge ofwhat firms would do without the 863(b)provi-
sions, any calculation of their revenueimpact is subject to error. Putting asidethe quantita-
tively unimportant issue of exporters with excessforeign tax credits who use 863(b) but
have net operating loss carryforwards,the main issue concerns the extent towhich firms
benefit from 863(b) allocations due to theirforeign-tax-credit status situations. Applying
the findings of Grubert, Randolph,and Rousslang (1996), who report that, in1992, 35
percent of foreign income is receivedby American multinational firms with excessforeign
tax credits, it follows that the $9.6billion figure might be reduced by 65 percent,to roughly
$3.4 billion, Of course, even this simplecalculation is likely to understate theactual reve-
nue effect of 863(b), since exporterswith excess foreign tax credits are morelikely to use
863(b) allocations than are others, andGrubert, Randolph, and Rousslang's35-percent
figure is calculated after 863(b) allocations areperformed.The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentivesand the Income Tax75
percent of export income from the domestictax base; moreover, export-
ers can simultaneously allocate half ofexport profits through 863(b).4°
Hence, this alternative implies thatthe value of 863(b) allocationsfor firms that use 863(b) exclusivelymust equal or exceed the availableFSC
benefit plus half the 863(b) benefit.It follows that the 863(b) allocation
when used exclusively must beworth at least double the FSC benefitof
excluding 15 percent of export profitsfrom taxable income.
Since gross 863(b) income in 1996equals $27.4 billion, it follows that this
income corresponds to the allocationof $54.8 billion of export profit.If
those export profits were insteadrouted entirely through FSCs using the
23-percent allocation method, theywould generate ($54.8)(O.15)(o.35)=
$2.9 bfflion of U.S. tax saving fromthe FSC exclusion. By theprevious
reasoning, the value of the $54.8 billionof 863(b) income must beat least
twice $2.9 billion, or $5.8 billion, whichexceeds four times thegovern- ment's estimates.
This calculation is subjectto three important limitations. Thefirst is
that not all exports are eligible forFSC treatment, so the lower boundon the value of section 863(b) benefitsshould exclude export income for
FSC-ineligible items. Restricting attentionjust to manufacturing indus-
tries, a subset of FSC-eligibleexport property, yields $18.2 billion of
section 863(b) income and impliedexport profits of $36.4 billion. This, in
turn, would generate $1.9 billion oftax saving if routed instead through
FSCs, so this 863(b) incomemust have been anticipated togenerate tax
savings of at least $3.8 billion, whichis almost three times thegovern- ment's estimate.
The second limitation is thatmany taxpayers using FSCs elect to allo-
cate half their export income through863(b) as a matter ofcourse, even though the 863(b) treatment mightbe of little value because theyhave
deficit foreign tax credits for theforeseeable future. In practice,the
magnitude of 863(b) income is such that,even if all FSC transactions
generated such 863(b) income, therenonetheless would have to exist
taxpayers who use the 863(b) allocationmethod exclusively. In orderto
estimate the magnitude of this income,it is necessary to infer total
export profits run through FSCs by invertingthe reported FSC manufac-
turing net exempt income of $7.4billion, which corresponds to$49.1
billion [($7.4 bilhion)/(O.15)} ofexport profit. If all taxpayers using FSCs
also allocated half of exportprofits (the maximum to which theyare
° Taxpayers have severaloptions other than the 23-percentcombined-taxablejncome method of determining FSC income,any of which can provide greater than 15-percent
exclusion of export income. Table 4 offerssuggestive but inconclusive evidence of theuse of these alternatives.76Desai & Hines
entitled) through 863(b), then$24.6 billion of 863(b) incomewould repre-
sent allocations by firmsrunning their exports throughFSCs.4'
In order to determine an extremelower bound on the exportsubsidy
through 863(b), suppose thatfirms using FSCs andsimultaneously allo-
cating half of export profitsthrough 863(b) consider the 863(b)allocation
to have zero value. Forthe purpose of calculating863(b) benefits, sup-
pose also that onlymanufactured exports can receiveFSC treatment.
Since manufacturing exportprofits allocated via section863(b) equal
$36.4 billion, it follows that aminimum of $11.8 billion (thedifference
between $36.4 bfflion and $24.6billion) of export profits wereallocated
through 863(b) without usingFSCs. These taxpayers had theoption of
simultaneously running their exportsthrough an FSC and allocating half
of export profits via 863(b),and chose not to do so. Usingthe same
methodology as above, this impliesthat the value of the 863(b) treatment
of these $11.8 billion of exportprofits exceeds the value ofrunning
corresponding exports through anFSC, or $1.24 billion.Thus, an ex-
treme lower bound ofthe value of 863(b) electionsfor 1996, based on
restricting FSCs to manufacturingonly, assuming that taxpayerssplit-
ting income betweenFSCs and 863(b) obtain no valuefrom the latter,
and assigning taxpayers with863(b) allocations the benefits theywould
have received had theychosen FSCs instead, is only11 percent below
the value reported by theU.S. federal government.'1
41 Note that this calculation ignores the "marginalcosting" option that taxpayers can use to
overstate FSC income. Since"marginal costing" is not an option inallocating 863(b) in-
come, the calculationtherefore overstates the amount of aggregate863(b) income derived
from FSC use and understates thetotal value of 863(b) allocations.
This figure is derived as ($11.8billion)(2)(O.15)(O.35) = $1.24 billion.
This calculation is predicated on a certaindegree of rationality on the part of taxpayers.
Naturally, even rational taxpayers can makeplanning mistakes, only to find afterwardthat
other choices would have led to morebeneficial tax outcomes. From the standpointof
export incentives, however, what mattersis what taxpayers believe at the timethey decide
to export goods from theUnited States. Since exporters are awareof their FSC options,
those who choose not to exercisethem in favor of 863(b) must believethat they have
available a more attractive alternative_whatevertheir ultimate tax situation may be at
year's end. There is a separate issueconcerning "definitely allocabledeductions" against
863(b) income. It is not clear whetherreported "definitely allocable deductions"actually
represent expense items that areappropriate to deduct from 863(b) incomeorif such
expenses would bedeductible from FSC income if taxpayerschose to route exports
through FSCs instead. Even grantingfull FSC deductibility to "definitelyallocable deduc-
tions" changes the lower-boundcalculation minimally. According tounpublished IRS
statistics, manufacturing exportersclaimed $4.9 billion of "definitely allocabledeductions"
against $18.2 billion of 863(b) incomein 1996. Hence, "definitelyallocable deductions"
represent 27 percent of gross 863(b) incomein manufacturing that year. By thisreasoning,
the $11.8 billion of gross exportprofits allocated strictly through 863(b)corresponds to $8.6
billion (73 percent of $11.8 billion)of net 863(b) income. The extreme lowerbound of theThe Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentivesand the Income Tax77
The third limitation is that thestarting point of these calculations is
information gleaned fromcorporate tax returns together with the official
revenue figures published by the federalgovernment. Inaccuracies in
this information will lead toerroneous conclusions. If, for example, the
federal government underestimatesthe revenue effect of FSCs, thenthe
preceding calculation wifi generatetoo high a lower bound of the value of
863(b) allocations. The general pointis that the existence of an FSC alterna-
tive implies a lower bound to thevalue that taxpayers must anticipate
receiving from 863(b), and this lowerbound exceeds official estimatesof the 863(b) tax saving. Sinceexport incentives are functions of whattax-
payers think they receive in return, it follows thattotal export incentives
exceed official estimates. Finally, thesecalculations omit consideration of
other export subsidies, suchas the foreign-source treatment of 100per- cent of the income of domestically-locatedforeign sales subsidiaries, for
which no public information isavailable.
Having established the relevant boundsfor the tax expendituresasso- ciated with 863(b), a conservative,central estimate can be derived by
assuming that one-half of all exports usingFSCs jointly use 863(b) and
that these 863(b) allocationsare not valuable to exporters. The value of
the remaining 863(b) allocationis established by doubling the FSC-
equivalent incentive as described above,yielding a tax-expenditure esti-
mate of $2.8 billion for the 863(b) subsidyin 1996.44 Combining this
figure with a $3.0 billion estimate forFSC tax expenditures,45 it follows
that the 1996 ratio of totalexport tax subsidies to total U.S. goodsex-
ports is $5.8 billion/$612 billion,or roughly 1 percent. In this sense, the
export subsidies provided through the incometax are equivalent to a
1-percent ad valorem subsidy.
4.4 Previous Estimates of the Effectof Export Incentives
There is extensive interest in the effectof U.S. export incentiveson the
behavior of American multinationalfirms. The U.S. Department of the
value of 863(b) elections for 1996 thenbecomes $905 million [which equals $8.6bil- lion)(2)(0.15)(0.35)].
This calculation begins with total netexempt income of $8.5 billion for FSCs in 1996. If half of these profits are allocated to foreignsource through 863(b) without providing
associated tax benefits, then $28.3 billion($4.2 bilhion/O.15) of the $54.8 billion of 863(b)
export-related profits should not be consideredin calculating the tax consequences of
863(b). The remaining $26.5 billion ofexport profits translates into estimated expenditures
of $2.8 billion as follows: ($26.5 billion)(2)(0.15)(035)= $2.78 billion.
This figure corresponds to $8.5 billion ofnet exempt income multiplied by the taxrate of 35%. It differs from the numbers providedin Figure 5 due to the lag between budget
estimates of tax expenditures and the publicationof the 1996 FSC report.78Desai & Hines
Treasury produces periodicestimates of the effect of the FSCand 863(b)
provisions on the volume ofU.S. exports. These estimates arebased on a
standard trade model that employsassumptions on the elasticity ofU.S.
supply and elasticity of foreigndemand for U.S. exports to derivethe
direct effects of the subsidiesalong with the indirect effectscreated by
changes in the exchange rate.Employing these methodologies, theU.S.
Treasury (1993, 1997) estimatesthat repeal of FSC provisionswould
have resulted in the loss of $1.5billion in goods exports in 1992and that
the repeal of the sales-sourcerules would have resulted in theloss of
$2.1 billion in goods exports in1990. In these reports, the impactof
exchange-rate changes on importsmitigates the overall impact ofthe
subsidies on the trade balance.
Horst and Pugel (1977)analyze the likely incidenceand allocative
effects of the DISC program inplace in the mid-1970s. Based on aset of
assumed demand elasticities andpricing behavior of American export-
ers, they concludethat the tax savings from DISCs arelikely to be three-
quarters reflected in lowerexport prices, and one-quarterreflected in
greater after-tax profits ofAmerican companies. Theyconclude, on the
basis of these estimates,that the DISC programincreased U.S. exports
by $2.1 bfflion in 1974, afigure significantly lower than theU.S. Treasury
estimate of $4.7 billion.
Mutti and Grubert (1984) create ageneral equilibrium model tostudy
the welfare consequencesof the DISC program. In thismodel, Mutti and
Grubert capture the direct effects onexporting behavior along with the
welfare consequences of capitalreallocations on three factors ofproduc-
tionskilled labor, unskilled labor,and capital. Employing parameter
values estimated from DISCsin 1979, the general equilibriummodel
suggests that removal of theDISC program would haveresulted in a 3.1-
percent decline in exportsand a welfare benefit of half the tax costof the
DISC program.
Rousslang and Tokarick (1994) estimatethat the FSC and sales-source
rules together have the sameeffect on trade volume as wouldreducing
American tariffs by more thanone-third. This study illustrates theambi-
guity of the welfare effectsof export tax incentives, due toterms-of-trade
effects that serve to counteractthe effect of preexisting tariffs.
Kemsley (1998) explores the effectof 863(b) on a firm's choice be-
tween offshore productionand domestic exporting. Kemsley'sstudy
differs from much Of thisliterature by examining the responsesof
actual firms to changing taxincentives. Kemsley analyzes apooled
cross-section of Americanmultinational firms from 1984 to 1992,find-
ing that firms with contemporaneousexcess tax credits havehigherThe Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentivesand the Income Tax79
ratios of exports to sales by foreign affiliatesthan do other firms. Since
exporting from the United States and sellinglocally by foreign affiliates
represent two substitute means of serving foreignmarkets, it follows
from Kemsley's results that the availabilityof excess foreign tax cred-
its encourages American firmsto export, though he does not test the
proposition directly.
5. EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTOF
EXPORT INCENTIVES
This section considers three types ofevidence of the market effect of
U.S. export incentives. The first is theexport impact of the 1984 DISC
repeal and transition to FSCs. The secondis the impact on the U.S.
dollar of events surrounding the 1997European complaint against the
United States before the WTO. The thirdis U.S. stock market reactions
to the 1997 WTO event. The results all indicatethat U.S. export incen-
tives have important effectson the behavior of American exporters.
5.1 The Impact of the 1984 DISC Repealon U.S.
Export Performance
As suggested by the aggregate evidenceprovided in Section 4.1, the 1984
repeal of the DISC provisions and theirreplacement with FSC provisions
appears to have had a large impact on theusage of these entities. While
FSCs were designed to offer roughly thesame tax subsidies as those
available with the prior DISCprogram, the use of FSCs is more cumber-
some in view of the need to create a new offshore entitymeeting various
requirements. Thus, the transition to the FSCregime may have prevented
exporters, particularly small exporters, from realizingthe benefits of the
export subsidies.
The regressions reported in Table 7explore the link between the
transition from DISCs to FSCs and subsequentexport performance. The
dependent variables in theseregressions are export growth rates of
two- and (non-overlapping) three-digit SICindustry segments within
manufacturing. In the specificationsreported in columns (1) and (2), the
dependent variable is thepercentage change in exports from 1984 to
1985. The mean and median of the dependentvariable are 3.14 and
3.84 percent, respectively.46 Averageexports per DISC in 1983 are
used to proxy for average exporter sizewithin industry segments, while
The dollar value of all U.S. exports dropped by2.4 percent from 1984 to 1985, and overall
manufacturing exports increased by only 1.4percent.80Desai & Hines
TABLE 7
The Effect of the 1984 DISCRepeal on U.S. Export Performance
Panel A: Regression Results
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)and (2) of Panel A is the percentage change inU.S. exports
from 1984 to 1985 by industry sector. Thedependent variable in columns (3) and (4) ofPanel A is the
percentage change in U.S. exports from 1984to 1986 by industry sector. "Average exports perDISC,
1983" is an industry's ratio of export grossreceipts (in $million) for all DISCs to thenumber of DISC
returns in 1983. "DISC share of U.S. exports,1983" is an industry's ratio of export gross receiptsfor all
DISCs to total exports in 1983. Observationscorrespond to (non-overlapping) two-digit andthree-digit
manufacturing industry segments. HeteroskedastiCity-consistefltstandard errors are in parentheses.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Panel B.
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R2 0.4594 0.5663 0.1842 0.2234
Number of observations 29 29 29 29





% change in U.S. exports:
1984-1985 29 -0.0314 -0.0384 0.0951
1984-1986 29 0.0023 0.0151 0.1368
Average exports per
DISC, 1983 29 15.7866 9.8800 20.0124
DISC share of U.S.
exports, 1983 29 0.5188 0.5308 0.2466The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentives and the Income Tax81
the importance of DISCs to an industry is captured by theshare of
exports routed through DISCs in 1983.
As colunm (2) illustrates, exports of manufacturing industriescharac-
terized by smaller average exporter size and higher initialuse of DISCs
grew more slowly in the year following repeal of the DISC provisions.
This specification suggests thatan increase of 1 percent in the DISC
share of industry exports corresponds to O.14-percent-slowerexport
growth between 1984 and 1985. This relationshipcan then be extrapo-
lated in order to estimate the effect of DISC repealon total manufactur-
ing exports, based on the insight that firms not usingDISCs in 1984
would not be adversely affected by their discontinuance.Since DISCs
accounted for 65.8 percent of manufacturing exports in 1983, it follows
that the 1984 change reduced anaverage industry's exports by 9.2 per-
cent (the product of 65.8 and 0.14 percent) compared toa hypothetical
industry that never uses DISCs.
In order to calculate the net effect of DISC repealon total U.S. manufac-
turing exports, it is necessary to incorporate theresponse of the exchange
rate, since long-run trade balance requires dollar weakeningto compen-
sate for reduced export subsidies. The impact of induced exchange-rate
changes is not captured in the estimated coefficient 0.14, sincethis coeffi-
cient is identified by differences between industries in their DISCusage
prior to 1985, while all industries face the same exchangerate. Taking the
aggregate price elasticity of U.S. exports to be roughly equal to 1.0, and
the aggregate price elasticity of U.S. imports to be roughly equalto 0.5,48
it follows that the exchange-rate response significantly mitigatesthe ex-
port effect of DISC removal.49 This calculation implies that the 1984 policy
change was responsible for a 3.1-percent decline in U.S.manufacturing
exports.
Table 7 also reports significant coefficientson average sizes of DISC
exporters, suggesting that the repeal of DISC legislationwas particularly
'Although 1982 legislation limited the attractiveness of DISCs, DISCusage did not abate
significantly by 1983. The results reported in Table 7are robust to using data on average
exporter size and share of exports in 1980. To the degree thatsome exporters used
multiple DISCs, the average-size variable would be improperly measured.Evidence pro-
vided in Table 5 suggests, however, thatat least in thecase of FSCsit is uncommon
for single exporters to use several export entities.
Sawyer and Sprinkle (1996) suggest these estimates on the basis of theirsurvey of
empirical studies of aggregate U.S. export and import elasticities. See alsoHooper, John-
son, and Marquez (1998).
" Based on these estimates, and starting from trade balance, DISC repealreduces exports
by 9.4 + e percent and reduces imports by 0.5e percent, in whiche is the change in the
dollar exchange rate. Trade balance then implies thate = 6.3, and the resulting change in
exports is 3.1 percent.82Desai & Hines
costly to smaller exporters. Evaluating thecoefficient reported in column
(2) at mean exports per DISC impliesthat doubling the average size of
exporters in an industry is associatedwith 6.5-percent-faster industry
export growth between 1984 and 1985.Columns (3) and (4) report similar
results for export performance over the1984-1986 period. The estimated
coefficients in these regressions are lesssignificant than are those for the
regressions reported in columns (1) and(2), reflecting the growing im-
portance over time of omitted variables.
The repeal of the DISC provisions and thetransition to the FSC/IC-
DISC regime represented an effort on the partof the United States to
provide a similar export subsidy through adifferent vehicle. The regres-
sions described in Table 7 suggest thatthese changes, while largely
formal rather than substantive, nonethelessworsened U.S. export perfor-
mance. As eventstranspired, the adverse consequences of DISC repeal
were attenuated by thesubsequent 1986 U.S. tax rate reduction, which
increased the numbers of exporters with excessforeign tax credits and
thereby heightened the value and importanceof 863(b) allocations.
5.2 Export Subsidies and ExchangeRates5°
U.S. tax policies encourage exports by improvingthe after-tax margins
received by American exporters. As a result,the introduction of an ex-
port subsidy typically makes exporters eagerto expand their sales
abroad, which in competitive markets results inreduced purchase prices
for foreign buyers and greater exportvolume.51 Long-run trade balance
then implies that the prices of Americangoods must appreciate relative
to the prices of foreign goods, sinceotherwise the United States would
become a net exporter. This price adjustment canbe accomplished either
by greater inflation differentials betweenthe United States and other
countries, or, more likely, by an appreciationof the value of the Ameri-
can dollar relative to the valuesof foreign currencies. One simple way to
think about how this happens is to note thatthe export subsidy makes
American goods more attractive to foreignbuyers, which leads to dollar
appreciation. The endogenous change in the valueof the dollar in turn
serves to attenuate the effectof the export subsidy on export volumes,
since American goods become lessattractive to foreign buyers as the
dollar appreciates. The net effect of the subsidyand the endogenous
° This section draws on Desai and Hines (2001).
51The situation is somewhat more complex whenfirms export to their own foreign affili-
ates, since then the existence of exportsubsidies encourages exporters to charge higher
export prices. This incentive conflicts withregulations that require firms to charge arm's-
length prices for exports to related parties, so the net effect onfinal prices is unclear. See
Rangan and Lawrence (1993) and Clausing (2001).The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentives and theIncome Tax83
change in the value of the dollar is to expandthe volumes of both
American exports and American imports. Theseexpansions are of
course nonuniform, and in particular, exports of goods thatare ineligible
for the tax subsidy will fall,even as exports of those that are eligible for
the tax subsidy wifi rise.
This section considers evidence of the impact ofthe FSC program on the
value of the American dollar relative to the valuesof foreign currencies.
Over the course of November 1997April 2000 therewere several twists
and turns in the negotiations between the UnitedStates and the World
Trade Organization over the likelihood of theretention of American export
subsidies. By looking at changes in the valueof the American dollar on
those dates, it is possible to infer the effect of theFSC program on proclivi-
ties to export from the United States. Sincemany other factors also influ-
ence exchange rates, it is necessary to interpret this informationcarefully.
The leftmost column of Table 8 identifiesthe dates of major events
surrounding the FSC controversy between theUnited States and the
WTO. Of these, two are prominent: November18, 1997, when the EU
complaint was first lodged with the WTO, andJuly 23, 1999, when the
WTO's Dispute Resolution Panel issued itsinterim report stating that
the American FSC program violated WTO rules.The July 23 report also
indicated that the United States would berequired to rescind its FSC
provisions by October 1, 2000. Contemporaneouspress accounts indi-
cate that both November 18, 1997 and July 23, 1999were considered
momentous dates in the history of the trade dispute; otherdates are
significant to differing degrees.
A simple way to identify the impact of theevents surrounding the
WTO controversy is to regress daily changes inthe value of the U.S.
dollar against dummy variables forevent dates, controlling for other
observable factors. Table 8 presents estimatedcoefficients from such
regressions. The sample for these regressionsconsists of foreign ex-
change trading days between January 1,1997 and June 13, 2000. The
dependent variable is the daily percentage changein the value of the
American dollar relative to the British pound sterling.52Since the depen-
dent variable is calculatedas the percentage change in numbers of
pounds to the dollar, it follows thata negative value of the dependent
variable corresponds to dollar weakening. Exchangerates are calculated
as of market closing in New York, so prices wifi reflectany impact of
European news on the same days.
52The British pound is chosen as the alternative to theU.S. dollar for these calculations
because it is a common benchmark currency, andone that was not buffeted either by
events surrounding the European Monetary Unionor the economic crises in Japan and
Asia.84Desai & Hines
TABLE 8
Exchange-Rate Responses to WTO Events'
(a) Dependent variable: one-day percentage changein £/$ exchange rate.



















December 17, 1997 -0.7160-0.7165-0.7101-0.7128
Inconclusive consultations (-) (0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0332) (0.0376)
February 10, 1998 -0.5695-0.5732-0.5758-0.5738
Inconclusive consultations (-) (0.0165) (0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0188)
July 23, 1999





































































April 7, 2000 0.1320 0.1360 0.1328 0.1365
Formal American response (+) (0.0165) (0.0210) (0.0171) (0.0214)
% change S&P 500 (US)











R2 0.0090 0.0096 0.0091 0.0096
Number of observations 840 810 840 810The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentives and the IncomeTax85
Note: The sample consists of observations of foreign exchange trading days betweenJanuary 1, 1997
and June 13, 2000. The columns report coefficients from OLS regressions inwhich the dependent
variable equals the daily percentage change in the value of the American dollar relativeto the British
pound sterling. Since the dependent variable is calculatedas the percentage change in numbers of
pounds to the dollar, a negative value of the dependent variable correspondsto dollar weakening.
The table reports estimated coefficients for dummy variables for each of theeleven event dates;
expected signs are indicated in parentheses. "% change IS&P 500 (US)FTSE 100 index(UK)]" is the
daily difference in percentage performance of the S&P 500 and FTSE 100indices. "Change (US-UK
interest-rate difference)" is the daily change in U.S. and British 90-daygovernment interest rates.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
The results reported in the first column of Table8 indicate that the dollar
weakened on November 18, 1997, falling by 0.1092percent against the
pound sterling. This decline is statistically significant andquite consistent
with the predicted effect of removing U.S. exportsubsidies, since doing
so shifts the supply schedule for American exports. Of course, the foreign
exchange market could not be confident,on the basis of the November 18,
1997 action, that the United States would ultimatelyremove the FSC
portion of its export tax subsidies. Nonetheless, itwas known at the time
that the United States was vulnerable to charges suchas those brought by
the European Union, since the FSCprogram was so similar to its ill-fated
predecessor, the DISC program. All thatwas necessary was for a major
complainant to appear with charges against the United States,and that
happened on November 18, 1997.
Given uncertainty over the ultimate impact ofany WTO action, an
exchange-rate response of roughly 0.1 percent is quite in linewith the
effect of estimated supply and demand elasticities.At an average profit
margin of 10 percent, a 15-percent tax exclusion reduces taxableincome
by 1.5 percent of sales. At a tax rate of 35 percent, thisgenerates a tax
saving of 0.5 percent of saleswhich, given the 35-percenttax rate,
produces approximately a 0.75-percent reduction in pricesat which ex-
porters would be willing to offer goods for foreign sale. Ofcourse, elimi-
nation of the FSC program would not necessarily entail eliminationof
export subsidies through Section 863(b) allocations,so not all the value
of FSC is likely to be lost in thecourse of a successful dispute brought by
the European Union.
It follows from the aggregate export and import price elasticities
cited earlier that an offsetting exchange-ratemovement of two-thirds
the size of the lost export subsidyor 0.5percentis required to
restore trade balance.53 Then allowing for the incompleteuse of FSCs,
and the backstop use of 863(b) allocations by firms currentlyelecting
Starting from trade balance, loss of FSC benefits reduces exports by 0.75+ e percent and
reduces imports by 0.5e percent, in which, e is the change in thedollar exchange rate.
Trade balance then implies that e = 0.5.86Desai & Hines
FSC treatment of their exports, reducesthis predicted effect, as does
uncertainty over the final disposition of theFSC program. So the likely
impact of the European Union action is toreduce the value of the
dollar by perhaps 0.1 percent, which appears tobe what happened on
November 18, 1997.
Subsequent events in the WTO controversy arealso associated with
changes in the value of the dollar, thoughthese events are likely to be
less important from the standpoint of theirdirect impact on dollar val-
ues. As reported in colunm(1) of Table 8, the failure of initial consulta-
tions between the United States and theEuropean Union on December
17, 1997 is associated with a fall of 0.7160 percentof dollar value, though
other major new items of the day no doubtcontributed to the dollar's fall
in value. Most other event dates areassociated with dollar movements
whose signs are consistent with the impact ofFSC removal on foreign-
exchange values, though the magnitudes ofthe estimated coefficients
are significantly greaterthan what might be expected from FSC removal
alone. Thus the failed second consultationsbetween the European
Union and the United States on February10, 1998 were associated with a
0.5695-percent drop in the value of the dollar,and the (largely antici-
pated) July 23, 1999 interim report of the DisputeResolution Panel with a
0.3004-percent drop. The attempted reconciliationof the United States
and the European Union on August 6, 1999 isassociated with a 0.1050-
percent strengthening of the dollar,while the (anticipated) September
17, 1999 WTO ruling against theUnited States is associated with a
0.0078-percent weakening. The Americanappeal on October 28, 1999
coincides with an appreciation of 0.3342 percentof the dollar's value,
and the withdrawal of this appeal on November2, 1999 coincides with a
depreciation of 0.3922 percent.
The only anomalous sign appears on February24, 2000, when the
fully anticipated WTO final ruling against theUnited States is associated
with a rise in the value of the dollar by0.4503 percent. The aggressive
February 28 response by U.S. Treasury SecretaryLawrence Summers is
associated with a dollar appreciation of 0.4981 percent,and the formal
American reply to the Dispute ResolutionBoard on April 7, 2000 is
associated with an appreciation of 0.1320 percent.
Since many events in the course of aday are likely to influence ex-
change rates, and the expected impact ofthe FSC program is subtle, it is
a mistake to overinterpretthe results reported in column (1) of Table 8.
Columns (2)(4) of the same table reportestimated coefficients from
regressions that add daily measures of changesin stock market indices
and short-term interest rates. Specifically,the stock market variable is
the daily difference in the performance(measured in percentage terms)The Uneasy Marriage of Export Incentives and the IncomeTax87
of the U.S. S&P 500 index and the British FTSE 100 index.The benefit of
including such a variable in the regression is thatstock market prices
reflect the impact of omittednews variables, such as economic news,
inflation fears, and various political developmentsthat may be corre-
lated with exchange-rate movements and thereforeimpart a correlation
between exchange rates and equity prices. Whenincluded in the regres-
sion reported in column (2) of Table 8, this variable takesthe expected
positive sign, while the absolute value of the coefficienton the dummy
variable for November 18, 1997 falls slightly to 0.1076. Column(3) intro-
duces a variable equal to the difference in the daily changein U.S. and
British short-term (90-day) government interestrates, which, when in-
cluded, has little effect on daily event coefficients. Theregression re-
ported in column (4) of Table 8 includes both the stockindex and
interest-rate differences, with results thatare similar to those reported in
column (2).
While the results reported in Table 8appear to be robust to the inclu-
sion of additional explanatory variables that reflect theeconomic signifi-
cance of daily events, it is inevitable that important factors are omitted.
November 18, 1997 differs from most others in beinga very slow news
day, the main international-trade-related nuggets being the(anticipated)
failure of a large Japanese bank and the lifting of theEuropean ban on
imports of Iranian pistachios. Hence, the filing ofa European complaint
against the United States was the major development, andit is reason-
able to infer that the exchange-rate movementon that day reflects the
impact of that news. While the consistency of the signpattern for other
event days, as reported in Table 8, is reassuring, these coefficientsreflect
the cumulative effect of many factors unrelatedto FSCs.
The November 18, 1997 evidence indicates that the marketreaction to
news of the European Union filing against the United States is consistent
with other evidence of aggregate trade demand and supplyelasticities,
and with an expectation that the inability touse FSCs would affect Ameri-
can exports. Hence this evidence serves the function of offeringa
market-based test of previous conjecturesas to the likely impact of FSCs
on export patterns.
5.3 Export Subsidies and Equity Prices
It is useful to consider other indicators of the market'sinterpretation of
events on November 18, 1997 in order to verify the role ofthe FSC
controversy in influencing the value of the dollaron that day. Stock
market valuations of publicly traded firms offer suchindications, since,
to the extent that the market believes the European Union complaintto
have an effect on the American FSCprogram, the profitability of major88Desai & Hines
American exporters is likely to be negativelyaffected. Correspondingly,
the reaction of stock prices can be used toidentify the incidence of these
export subsidies.
The American stock market fell on November18, 1997, but this in itself
is inconclusive, since many factorsinfluence stock prices. It is more
instructive to contrast the performance of firmsfor which exports repre-
sent large fractions of their totalsales with firms for which exports are
relatively unimportant. In order to reduce theproblems that inevitably
accompany such comparisons,attention is restricted to firms reporting
export sales, specifically Compustatfirms continuously reporting their
exports (which in some cases arezero) over the 1992-1998 period. This
sample of 630 firms was divided into two groups,based on the fraction
of total sales accounted for by exportsfrom the United States, and di-
vided at the median ratio of exports tototal sales (approximately 11
percent). Within each group, stock price returnsfor November 18, 1997
were calculated, and within-groupmedians compared.
Figure 6 depicts this comparison. Firmsfor which export sales repre-
sented more than 11 percent of total sales in1997 generally lost value on
November 18, 1997, the median loss representing0.7169 percent of the
start-of-day stock value. Firms for which exportsales represented less
than 11 percent of total sales in 1997 alsogenerally lost value on Novem-
ber 18, 1997, but these losses wereconsiderably milder, the median loss
representing just 0.2379 percent of thestart-of-day stock value. This
pattern is consistent with the valuelosses that would accompany the
inability to benefit from FSCs in the future,and is all the more striking in
light of the fact that a reduced value ofthe American dollar generally
enhances the stock market prices (which arequoted in dollars) of major
exporters.
It is possible to take this analysis one stepfurther, since even among
firms with identical export exposuresthere is variation in the degree of
share price sensitivity to future changes intax subsidies for exports. In
particular, firms with net operating loss(NOL) carryforwards do not pay
current taxes, and have some chanceof never doing so. To be sure, the
existence of NOL carryforwards is animperfect indicator of future tax
sensitivity, but nonetheless one that isuseful to consider.
Figure 7 depicts the stock price reactions onNovember 18, 1997 of
firms with and without NOLcarryforwards. The median firm with NOL
carryforwards and a large fraction of sales from exportslost 0.674 per-
cent of value on that day, whilethe median NOL firm with a small
n See Desai and Hines (2000b) for a more detailed econometric evaluationof the evidence






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5The Uneasy Marriage of ExportIncentives and the Income Tax91
fraction of export sales lost 0.377percent. The difference was consider-
ably starker for firms without NOLcarryforwards, where the median
firm with a large fraction ofexport sales lost 0.7976 percent of value,
while the median firm witha small fraction of export sales lost just
0.2263 percent of value. The patterndescribed in Figure 7 is quiteconsis-
tent with expectations of future tax liabilities,since firms without NOL
carryforwards are generallymore tax-sensitive than those with NOL
carryforwards. Furthermore, the differencebetween group medianre-
turns is generally consistent with differencesin lost value as calculated
from export fractions.55
6. CONCLUSION
The U.S. government provides sizableexport incentives through the tax
system. Because these tax subsidiesare delivered in complicatedways,
it can be difficult to assess their effectson behavior or even their overall
magnitudes. What evidence is availablesuggests that the current,
roughly $4 billion a year, subsidyavailable from the use of FSCs is
matched in magnitude by the subsidyassociated with the allocation of
export profits to foreign-source income.In combination, the export-
related benefits available through theincome tax translate to a 1-percent
ad valorem equivalent export subsidy.
There is ample evidence that theseexport incentives influence the
behavior of American taxpayers. Repealof the DISC system in 1984, and
its replacement with FSCs, isassociated with significant changes in the
patterns of American exports. This behavioralresponse suggests that the
1984 legislation did more than justreplace one system withan identical
alternative designed to meet GATT legalrequirements. Event studies of
market reactions to the WTO disputesimilarly indicate the importance of
these export subsidies. Foreign exchangemarkets reacted to the possibil-
ity of reduced American export subsidies,particularly as evidenced by
the dollar's fall on November 18,1997, the date on which Europe first
filed its complaint with the WTO. TheAmerican stock market likewise
reacted negatively to the WTOnews on that date, with share prices of
major American exporters falling inresponse to the possibility that their
tax obligations might rise in the future.
Whatever one may think of theeconomic merits of providingexport subsidies, it is clear that the Americanpractice of embedding them
See Desai arid Hines (2000b) fora detailed calculation.92Desai & Hines
within the income tax systemintroduces several distortionscompared to
the simple ad valorem alternative.First, U.S. tax subsidies are notavail-
able for all categories of exportgoods, and administrative requirements
make access costly for small exporters.Second, export incentives vary
according to an exporter's profit rateand tax-loss carryforward situation.
And third, an important classof export subsidy is availableonly to
multinational firms with highly taxedforeign income. These consider-
ations might be weighed againstwhatever advantages stem fromcompli-
cating the workings of thesesubsidies and thereby obscuringthem from
casual inspection.
Multinational firms are responsiblefor most American exports, and
these firms are subject to a verycomplicated array of tax rules providing
what are often very curiousincentives. The current trade disputebe-
tween the European Unionand the United States draws closeattention to
the size and importance offoreign sales corporations, and maythereby
result in a new and differentkind of export subsidy throughthe tax
system. One possibility is thatFSCs might be replaced with a moreuni-
form type of export incentivethat would entail fewer economicdistor-
tions than the current system.Whatever the outcome of the current
dispute, this is unlikely to bethe last time that American policies are
challenged by members of the WorldTrade Organization. And similarly,
whatever system replaces the currentFSC regime is not likely to bethe
final tax program to encourageAmerican exports.
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